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The Co-Evolution of the Washington 
Consensus and the Economic 
Development Discourse
Ravi Kanbur
I. Introduction
The 1980s were a hell of a decade. They began with the reverbera-
tions of the second OPEC oil shock and ended with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. In between, we had the Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl economic policy 
era in North America and Europe, the Volcker interest rate shock, the 
Latin American debt crisis, economic collapse in Africa, the start of 
rapid growth in China and India, and on and on. Oh, and by the way, 
in 1989 John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus.”1
The intellectual history of this term over the past two decades is 
intimately tied in with the economic history of this period, just as its 
origins were tied to the economic history of the 1980s. Yet the term 
and its meanings have also interacted with a broader discourse on 
economic development—in particular, how government policies and 
interventions can help or harm development. In fact, the Washington 
Consensus, the development discourse, and actual economic policy 
and outcomes have all co-evolved over the past twenty years, each 
influencing and being influenced by the others. The 1990s and 2000s 
have been no less interesting and eventful than the 1980s, exhibiting an 
acceleration in global integration in trade and financial flows, “shock 
therapy” in the formerly communist countries, the East Asian financial 
crisis, rapid growth in a number of Asian countries and spectacular 
growth in China with perhaps the most dramatic reduction in income 
poverty in history, and sharp increases in inequality in rapidly grow-
ing countries.
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In this essay, I give an account of the development debates of the 
past two decades, focusing on the Washington Consensus and on the 
broader economic development discourse in its historical context. Sec-
tion II gives a basic account of the Washington Consensus and how its 
meaning changed from the original formulation. Section III presents 
the evolution of the economic development discourse since the Second 
World War, through the 1980s, and up to the present. Section IV asks if 
there is now a new consensus on economic development in light of the 
recent report of the Commission on Growth and Development. Section 
V concludes the essay.
My focus is primarily on the economic, and naturally relates to my 
own academic writing and policy experience. In this sense, the account 
will be somewhat idiosyncratic, but I hope that it will provide suffi-
cient food for wider thought and debate.
II. The Washington Consensus: Mutation of Meanings
The best account of how the Washington Consensus was coined and 
formulated is given by John Williamson himself. It is quoted in full in 
Box 1 (to ensure that we are on the “same page” with the original con-
tent as envisaged by the author).
Box 1
The Origin of the Washington Consensus
“The story of the Washington Consensus dates back to 1989, when the 
press in the United States was still talking about how Latin American 
countries were unwilling to undertake the reforms that might give them 
a chance to escape the debt crisis. It seemed to me that this was a mis-
conception and that, in fact, a sea change in attitudes toward economic 
policy was occurring. To determine whether this was correct, the Insti-
tute for International Economics decided to convene a conference at 
which authors from 10 Latin American nations would present papers 
detailing what had been happening in their respective countries. To try 
to make sure that they all addressed a common set of questions, I wrote 
a background paper in which I listed 10 policy reforms that I argued 
almost everyone in Washington thought were needed in Latin America 
as of that date. I labeled this reform agenda the “Washington Consen-
sus,” never dreaming that I was coining a term that would become a war 
cry in ideological debates for more than a decade. Indeed, I thought the 
ideas I was laying out were consensual, which is why I gave them the 
label I did. The 10 reforms that constituted my list were as follows:
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Fiscal discipline. This was in the context of a region where almost all the 
countries had run large deficits that led to balance of payments crises 
and were experiencing high inflation that hit mainly the poor because 
the rich could park their money abroad.
Reordering public expenditure priorities. This suggested switching 
expenditure, in a progrowth and propoor way, from things like nonmerit 
subsidies to basic health care, education, and infrastructure.
Tax reform. The aim was a tax system that would combine a broad tax 
base with moderate marginal tax rates.
Liberalization of interest rates. In retrospect, I wish I had formulated 
this more broadly as financial liberalization, stressed that views differed 
on how fast it should be achieved, and recognized the importance of 
accompanying financial liberalization with prudential supervision.
A competitive exchange rate. I fear I indulged in wishful thinking 
in asserting that there was a consensus in favor of ensuring that the 
exchange rate would be competitive, which implies an intermediate 
regime; in fact, Washington was already beginning to edge toward the 
two-corner doctrine, which holds that a country must either fix firmly or 
float “cleanly.”
Trade liberalization. I acknowledged that there was a difference of view 
about how fast trade should be liberalized, but everyone agreed that this 
was the appropriate direction in which to move.
Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment. I specifically did not 
include comprehensive capital account liberalization because I did not 
believe that it commanded a consensus in Washington.
Privatization. This was the one area in which what originated as a neo-
liberal idea won broad acceptance. We have since been made very con-
scious that it matters a lot how privatization is done: it can be a highly 
corrupt process that transfers assets to a privileged elite for a fraction 
of their true value, but the evidence is that privatization brings benefits 
(especially in terms of improved service) when done properly, and the 
privatized enterprise either sells into a competitive market or is properly 
regulated.
Deregulation. This focused specifically on easing barriers to entry and 
exit, not on abolishing safety or environmental regulations (or regula-
tions governing prices in a noncompetitive industry).
Property rights. This was primarily about providing the informal sector 
with the ability to gain property rights at an acceptable cost (inspired by 
Hernando de Soto’s analysis).”       Williamson (2003)
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Although Williamson writes that in 1989 he was reporting factually 
on what was the consensus among certain key constituencies, both 
in his original paper of 1990 and in the commentary above there is a 
strong strain of what the policy reforms should be. In other words, the 
normative is quite closely tied to the positive. With this in mind, I think 
those who use the label Washington Consensus as interchangeable 
with “neo-liberal” or “market fundamentalist” would be surprised 
to read the above account. For example, how many people know that 
“Reordering public expenditure priorities” to switch towards basic 
health care and education was number two in the original list of ten? 
Or that while liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment was 
on the list, capital account liberalization was not? Or that “Deregula-
tion” did not include the abolition of safety or environmental regula-
tions, or of regulation of prices in noncompetitive industries? Other 
items of commentary, given above or in Williamson’s other writings,2 
also indicate that, at least in the mind of the originator, the Washing-
ton Consensus was not the same as (perhaps even nowhere near) a 
“neo-liberal” or “market fundamentalist” agenda.3 Clearly, something 
strange happened.
What explains the evolution of the term from its meaning as origi-
nally coined to representing one side of an ideological divide that 
structured much of the development discourse in the 1990s? In com-
menting on Williamson (1999), I offer the following explanation, based 
on my operational experience within the World Bank:
It might be useful to start with the observation that the Washington Con-
sensus became what it did, not what it said. For example, Williamson 
notes that ‘when I reviewed the progress Latin American countries had 
made implementing the recommended set of policies several years later, 
I concluded that the least progress had been made in implementing the 
second policy, redirecting public expenditure policies.’ Well, is it not then 
understandable that those in civil society who saw outcomes rather than 
read Williamson’s original paper, would conclude that the Washington 
Consensus did not contain item number 2? The same is true of the other 
items, where those in developing countries might have seen positions 
espoused, by representatives of Washington institutions, which were not 
as nuanced as Williamson’s original or more recent formulations.
And here we come to what to me is the most important point. Mind-
set, and stance, are all important. There is no question in my mind that 
in the 1980s, and to a certain extent well into the 1990s, many saw the 
main task as being storming the citadel of statist development strategies. 
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In this mindset, nuances were beside the point—intellectual curiosities 
which paled in comparison to the benefits of rapid and deep move-
ments away from the former paradigm. And, moreover, Washington 
institutions were deeply suspicious of the real intentions of those they 
were dealing with. They suspected, perhaps rightly, that those on the 
other side were hell bent on preserving the status quo. In this setting, a 
negotiating stance, rather than a dialogue based on mutual comprehen-
sion, was appropriate. So the negotiators from Washington always took 
a more purist stance, a more extreme stance than even their own intel-
lectual framework permitted (they were all surely well schooled in the 
theory of the second best). ‘Give them an inch of nuance, and they’ll take 
a mile of status quo,’ seemed to be the mindset and the stance. ‘If you 
want 28 enterprises privatized, start by asking for 56,’ seemed to be the 
opening gambit. Is it any wonder, then, that those on the other side came 
away with the impression that those from Washington had a consensus, 
and one which did not match Williamson’s nuanced formulation?4
Still, all this is perhaps by the by. What matters is not so much the 
label but the content, and on that there is little disagreement. Develop-
ment strategies, broadly construed, can be put on a spectrum, with 
less market orientation, less integration into the world economy, more 
regulation of economic activity, a greater role for public provision of 
social services, and more redistribution at one end and the opposite 
at the other end. Neo-liberal might be one term to describe combina-
tions towards the “right” of the spectrum. What term to use for the 
“left” end of the spectrum is not entirely clear—perhaps “progressive,” 
“liberal” (in the U.S. sense), or “statist.” Each of these, or any other 
term, is liable to cause confusion. It is a measure of the difficulties of 
nomenclature that the unwieldy “non-neo-liberal” might be the least 
confusing appellation—at least in relation to the other end of the spec-
trum being labeled “neo-liberal.” Further, in recent years, the words 
“globalizers” and “anti-globalizers” have also been used to describe 
the two ends of the spectrum, although technically speaking globaliza-
tion should apply only to the external dimensions of economic policy. 
I will use many different terms in this essay, but perhaps the “left” 
and “right” end of the spectrum is best descriptive of the linear repre-
sentation adopted above, as well as suggestive of political orientation 
(but only suggestive, of course). An important point, however, is that 
what we have in terms of policy space is a continuum—it is not a case 
of one or the other, but rather one of having a combination of policies 
whose center of gravity is closer to one end than the other. How have 
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these combinations changed and shifted over the six decades since the 
Second World War, including during the last two decades after the 
christening of the Washington Consensus?
III. The Economic Development Discourse since the 
Second World War5
The sixty years since the end of the Second World War have seen cycles 
of consensus among the economic policymaking elite. The center of 
gravity of where to locate economic policies along the non-neo-liberal 
to neo-liberal continuum, from “left” to “right,” and in what combina-
tions, has moved first one way and then another. It is worth reprising 
this history to better locate the emergence of the Washington Consen-
sus in its era and its subsequent evolution.
The quarter century after the Second World War saw the peak of 
the inward-oriented, state-oriented development paradigm driven by 
an acceptance of the pervasiveness of market failures (or nonexistence 
of many markets) in developing countries. Export pessimism was the 
rationale for import-substitution strategies. The perceived success of 
Keynesian policies in restoring full employment in the industrialized 
West after prolonged high unemployment in the 1930s, and of the 
Soviet Union in transforming itself from an agrarian nation at the time 
of the communist revolution to an industrial power in the 1930s, ’40s, 
and ’50s, was the spur to the setting up of the Indian Five-Year Plans. 
Their objectives were aggregate demand management and heavy 
investment in state industries behind walls of tariff protection.6 The 
newly independent countries in Africa followed a similar path, set-
ting up marketing boards as purchasing and selling intermediaries 
to protect their farmers from the vagaries of world-market prices and 
the perceived exploitation by middlemen traders, a range of state-con-
trolled industries to process raw material, and more.
Agencies like the World Bank, surprising though it may seem today, 
were in full support of such strategies. After all, Keynes designed the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as a publicly 
owned entity to mediate between sources of finance (essentially, Wall 
Street) and European and Japanese infrastructure reconstruction. As 
attention shifted from the reconstruction of Europe and Japan to the 
development of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the statist 
thrust remained. The World Bank financed many of the state enter-
prises that were producing behind import barriers in countries that 
Ravi Kanbur
39
emerged from successive waves of postwar decolonization. Economic 
growth rates in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were creditable by his-
torical standards and, in countries like Brazil, remarkably high.
The statist approach of the 1940s and 1950s was not without its crit-
ics—for its insensitivity to distributional issues, that is. The emphasis 
on heavy industry, whatever its impact on investment and economic 
growth, was argued to be not helping the poor. In Brazil, the high 
growth period of the 1960s was accompanied by increasing inequal-
ity, with the result that the impact on poverty was dissipated. In India, 
after the first two Five-Year Plans (1951–56 and 1956–61), the third Five-
Year Plan (1961–66) began a period of explicit focus on poverty and the 
poor, with special attention paid to agriculture, in which the bulk of 
the poor worked. This emphasis continued in the fourth and fifth Five-
Year Plans. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s slogan in the election of the 
early 1970s was “Garibi Hatao” (End Poverty).
The international agencies were undergoing a similar transforma-
tion. The President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, made his 
famous Nairobi speech in 1973, in which he spoke of “absolute pov-
erty: a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition 
and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities and a condi-
tion of life so common as to be the lot of some 40% of the peoples of the 
developing countries.” He spoke of the rural poor and specified rural 
development as a development goal. The International Labour Organi-
zation introduced the “basic needs” approach to development and the 
“informal sector” as a key component of urban poverty. At the same 
time, the World Bank’s Chief Economist, Hollis Chenery, published a 
volume entitled, “Redistribution with Growth.”7
The statist and import-substitution approach to development contin-
ued, however. During the fourth Five-Year Plan in India, major national 
banks were nationalized. Latin America and Africa continued on their 
route of import substitution and nationalization strategies. But in the 
1960s and 1970s there emerged a story of development success that 
was to have a major impact on the development discourse. This was 
the “growth with equity” experienced by the East Asian economies 
of South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia. In these economies, income 
poverty had fallen significantly in the wake of historically high growth 
rates. There was consensus on the distributional side of the story: land 
reform in South Korea and Taiwan (imposed by America after the 
war), the early spread of basic education, and the growth of demand 
for unskilled labor in labor-intensive export industries.
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It is the last of these outcomes that set in train the calls for trade 
liberalization, which framed the development debate for the next two 
decades and continue to do so today. That the East Asian economies 
had rising unskilled wages, and that there was increasing employ-
ment in light industries manufacturing for exports, is agreed. But how 
exactly this came about, and its policy implications for other countries, 
is disputed. In particular, the importance of sequencing—of starting 
with protection and then gradually opening up—is much debated. At 
the same time, the role of the financial sector (and the extent to which it 
was regulated and directed to provide credit for key industries) is also 
an exhibit in the clash of evidence on whether the “East Asian Miracle” 
owes its emergence to policies on the “left” or the “right” end of the 
spectrum discussed earlier.
The 1970s were thus a decade of considerable rethinking of the eco-
nomic development paradigm that had dominated the previous three 
decades. The macro-level policies of trade protection and heavy state 
intervention in industry were criticized from the “left” for not giving 
distribution sufficient attention, and from the “right” for giving insuf-
ficient attention to trade and to the private sector.
There things stood till the 1980s, which, as I said at the start, was a 
hell of a decade. There was a swing away from postwar Keynesianism 
in Europe and North America, which had its own political economic 
logic. As the OPEC oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 worked their way 
through the system, they led to severe balance of payments difficulties 
for non-oil exporting countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The 
U.S. Federal Reserve, under Paul Volcker, raised interest rates dramati-
cally to squeeze inflation out of the system in the U.S., with a resultant 
rise in the dollar. But this led to unsustainable debt repayment burdens 
(mostly dollar denominated) for many countries in Latin America, with 
a debt crisis and a generalized macroeconomic crisis in those countries 
and several others with heavy exposure to external debt.
The macroeconomic crises of developing countries had an inextri-
cable external dimension. The immediate crisis was a lack of foreign 
exchange to service debts and purchase imports. In this context, trade 
liberalization was advanced as a solution to generate foreign exchange 
through exports. The crisis arguments meshed with longer-term con-
testations on the efficacy of inward-looking versus outward-oriented 
development strategies. When necessary, the case was bolstered fur-
ther by the argument that such a strategy would increase demand 
for unskilled labor and hence provide better unskilled wages, as had 
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happened in East Asia. But the main thrust of the argument was that 
integration into the global economy was the best strategy for economic 
growth, and growth was the best route to poverty reduction.
Then came 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the triumphalism of 
“the end of history.” This was the culmination of the general pressure 
for reducing the role of the state in the economy that had started in the 
1970s in Europe and North America and saw its zenith in the Reagan-
Thatcher-Kohl era. With the collapse of the communist statist system 
(the writing was on the wall in the early 1980s in any event), the lessons 
for developing countries also seemed clear. Just as the Soviet successes 
of the 1930s, ’40s, and ’50s had inspired the first two Indian Five-Year 
Plans (and had continued to influence the next ones), the sixth and sev-
enth Five-Year Plans (1980–85 and 1985–89) began the process of eco-
nomic liberalization. Key price controls were abolished. After a period 
of political instability, in 1991 major external liberalization measures 
were announced, and the gradual opening of the Indian economy was 
undertaken during the eighth Five-Year Plan period (1992–97).
In Africa, external liberalization was undertaken, the most obvious 
indicators of which were the freeing of the exchange rate from controls 
and rationing in most of Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as the 
gradual removal of quantitative trade restrictions and the lowering of 
tariffs. In Latin America, similar external sector liberalizations were 
undertaken. In all countries, the debt burden meant significant auster-
ity in public sector budgets because balance was sought between reve-
nue and expenditure. In the formerly communist transition economies 
of Eastern Europe, the early 1990s saw regimes of “shock therapy,” as 
economies were opened up and privatized “at a stroke.”
The 1980s and 1990s also witnessed the opening up and integration 
of China into the global economy (formally, the Chinese process began 
in 1978). While politically communist, China increasingly took on the 
characteristics of a market economy, with peasants being allowed to 
keep what they produced, inward foreign investment, and spectacular 
increases in exports, investment, and economic growth. At least 200 
million Chinese have been lifted out of income poverty since the open-
ing up began in 1978, perhaps the most dramatic reduction in poverty 
in history.
Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s, the economic development dis-
course took a distinct turn away from the previous consensus among 
the economic policymaking elite. Williamson specifies that the “Wash-
ington” of the Washington Consensus is “both the political Washing-
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ton of Congress and senior members of the administration and the 
technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the 
economic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board, 
and the think tanks.”8 Here, I identify what I call a “Ministry of Finance 
tendency:”
In this group would obviously be some who worked in finance min-
istries in the North, and in the South. It would also include many eco-
nomic analysts, economic policy managers and operational managers in 
the IFI’s and the Regional Multilateral Banks. A key constituent would 
be the financial press, particularly in the North but also in the South. 
Finally, one would include many, though not all, academic economists 
trained in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.9
Obviously, these are tendencies and not hard and fast classifica-
tions: “There are clearly people who work in the IFIs who are not 
‘Finance Ministry types,’ just as there are academic economists trained 
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition who would, for example, caution strongly 
on capital account liberalization.”10 But they are recognizable, I think, 
as a constituency that held views at the “right” end of the policy spec-
trum. In this sense, the 1980s and 1990s saw a swing towards this 
constituency—although it should be emphasized that these very same 
constituencies (not necessarily the same individuals) were at the other 
end of the spectrum in an earlier era.
The challenges to the new consensus were not slow in appearing, 
and many of them were embedded in the previous discourse. As I said 
at the start of my 2001 book, “The end of history lasted for such a short 
time.” I will argue that these challenges, in turn, have led to a modi-
fication of the center of gravity of the consensus along the spectrum 
from “right” to “left.” A number of outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s 
contributed to the challenges and their effectiveness. Five examples 
will illustrate this point.
First, the East Asia crisis of 1997 was a major blow to those who 
were arguing for rapid capital account opening to move further to the 
“right” along the spectrum. The debate on this among economists was 
interesting because they were split. It is not surprising that those who 
were generally skeptical of a strong move to the “right,” such as Sti-
glitz (2002), would oppose capital account liberalization. What might 
surprise some is that economists like Jagdish Bhagwati, a staunch 
supporter of trade liberalization and foreign direct investment, was 
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equally vocal against the hasty liberalization of financial flows that 
was advocated, encouraged, and sometimes imposed in the 1980s and 
1990s. Bhagwati’s position is worth quoting at length as an antidote to 
the simplistic classifications one sometimes finds of “pro” or “anti” 
free market positions.
Starting in Thailand in the summer of 1997, the Asian financial cri-
sis swept through Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea, turning the 
region’s economic miracle into a debacle… . The crisis, precipitated by 
panic-fueled outflows of capital, was a product of hasty and imprudent 
financial liberalization, almost always under foreign pressure, allowing 
free international flows of short-term capital without adequate attention 
to the potentially potent downside of such globalization. There has been 
no shortage of excuses and strained explanations scapegoating the vic-
tims, suggesting they committed hara-kiri instead of being slaughtered. 
It is hard not to conclude that the motivation underlying these specious 
explanations is a desire to continue to maintain ideological positions 
in favor of a policy of free capital flows or to escape responsibility for 
playing a central role in pushing for what one might aptly call gung-ho 
international financial capitalism.11
This from a man who also wrote, in the same book:
In short, I argue that the notion that globalization needs a human face—a 
staple of popular rhetoric that has become a dangerous cliché—is wrong, 
It raises a false alarm. Globalization has a human face, but we can make 
that face yet more agreeable.12
In any event, the East Asia crisis led to a reconsideration of financial 
flows liberalization, with the result that even the IMF is now more cau-
tious in advocating this move.13
The second set of “facts on the ground” that posed a challenge to 
the emerging consensus on economic policy for development in the 
1990s was the disastrous experience of most transition economies of 
Eastern Europe. It was suggested humorously by some that the “shock 
therapy” of rapid privatization and quick integration into the world 
economy was “more shock than therapy.” These economies underwent 
exactly the opposite of the East Asian miracle of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Instead of growth with equity, they had economic decline with increas-
ing inequality. This outcome was attributed, by many economists, 
including Stiglitz (2002), and by the populations of these countries, 
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to an overly hasty and radical move from a statist past to a market-
oriented future, without regulatory safeguards or safety nets. These 
economies are only now recovering from economic decline, some two 
decades after the transition began, and the inequalities introduced into 
the system by rapid privatization are now part of the economic and 
political structure of countries like Russia.
Third and more generally, many countries in Africa and Latin 
America that followed the prescriptions of greater trade openness and 
greater reliance on markets did not reap the growth benefits that were 
touted for them. Even those that grew, like Ghana, found the results to 
be short of what had been promised. Many countries in Latin America 
in particular had slow growth rates, leading to entire decades being 
described as “lost.”14
Fourth, the rapid growth of India and China, and the recognition 
that these countries have not followed the neo-liberal prescriptions à 
l’outrance, has influenced the discourse. Both nations have adopted a 
more outward-oriented development strategy than in the past (China 
since the 1980s, India since the 1990s). But both countries maintained 
controls on capital flows. As a result, they escaped the repercussions of 
the East Asian crisis. China has deployed its internal financial system 
to maintain an undervalued exchange rate, a key reason for its dra-
matic export performance. In addition, both countries have continued 
to use domestic redistribution to address rising inequality.
The fifth set of outcomes is, in fact, the sharp increases in inequality 
within rapidly growing countries over the past twenty years. Whether 
it is China, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Russia, Ghana, South Africa, 
Mexico, etc., and in contrast to the East Asian experience of the 1960s 
and 1970s, rapid growth seems to be accompanied by rising inequality. 
This has been matched by rising inequality within OECD countries, as 
the postwar phase of the “the great compression” of skilled-unskilled 
wage differentials ended in the 1980s and economic returns to skills 
and education began to increase dramatically. For developing coun-
tries, even when official poverty statistics have come down because 
of rapid growth, distributional concerns persist in society and with 
policymakers. In India in 2004, a party with the slogan “India Shining” 
was defeated by a party with the slogan “The Common Man,” leading, 
for example, to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which 
introduced a massive public works scheme designed to address low 
incomes in rural areas. In South Africa, the post-apartheid euphoria 
has been dampened by rising inequalities, including within the black 
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population. In Latin America, a wave of populist leaders has been 
elected on the strength of concerns about rising inequality and vulner-
ability. In China, even if there is no formal Western-style democracy, 
and even with brilliant performance on growth and poverty reduction, 
policymakers are worried about growing disparities between people 
and between regions. They have begun to intensify redistributive mea-
sures.15
These and other developments in the last two decades, particularly 
in the last decade, have led to considerable rethinking in the economic 
development discourse. Does this mean there is a new consensus? The 
next section takes up that story.
IV. A New Consensus?
The challenges to the Washington Consensus—to what it became, if 
not to what it was—have come in academic journal discourse, in the 
urgency of policy settings, in the heat of civil society discourse, and 
in tear gas on the streets from Cochabamba to Seattle. The initial reac-
tion to the challenges was one of circling the wagons. (I discussed the 
“negotiating mindset” in Section II.) The U.S. Treasury took a strong 
position on the benefits of global integration and private markets, and 
was a major player in influencing the IMF to go for capital account 
liberalization in the early 1990s.16 It further pushed rapid privatization 
in Eastern Europe and trade liberalization in the developing countries 
of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Particularly at the end of the 1990s, 
with street battles in Seattle and the sieges of the annual meetings of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, positions were 
sharply divided between what I have called the “Ministry of Finance 
tendency” and the “Civil Society tendency.”17 It did not seem as though 
there could be any sort of consensus on economic policy, poverty, and 
distribution.18
And yet, as the 1990s and the 2000s wore on, and as the “facts on 
the ground” began to accumulate, a discernible shift did begin to take 
place in the economic development discourse. I have already men-
tioned the turnaround in the IMF’s (and the U.S. Treasury’s) position 
on capital account liberalization. More recently have come reassess-
ments of their positions on trade liberalization by economists like Law-
rence Summers, who were in the forefront of pushing for rapid global 
integration. Rising inequality in the United States and Europe has tem-
pered their zeal and seems to have occasioned a broader rethink:
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Continuing to assert that protection is bad and that globalization is 
invevitable and therefore governments should do more to help the losers 
while at the same time ignoring the challenge that globalization poses to 
progressive taxation and other policies to assure that economic progress 
is widely shared is I believe a prescription for failure. True friends of 
global integration and of the developing world will work to design more 
ways to insure that a more integrated and prosperous global economy is 
one from which all will benefit.19
Such statements have been characterized as “recantation.” In the 
article to which Summers is a response, Kapur, Mehta and Subrama-
nian note the following:
The problem Mr Summers identifies, the hyper-mobility of capital, was 
an outcome that he and the US actively promoted. Attracting foreign 
capital was one of the raisons d’être of the Washington Consensus-based 
reforms. Developing countries were forced to change their intellectual 
property laws. At the US Treasury, Mr Summers was a leading propo-
nent of capital account liberalisation by developing countries. Having 
swallowed those bitter pills of intellectual property protection and capi-
tal mobility as a necessary price for a better future, developing countries 
are now told that those medicines cause problems that need more—in 
this case protectionist—medication.20
In any event, there seems to be considerable repositioning going on 
in the economic policy discourse. As David Wessel of the Wall Street 
Journal notes:
A new argument is emerging among the pro-globalization crowd in the 
U.S., the folks who see continued globalization and trade as vital to the 
country’s prosperity: Tax the rich more heavily to thwart an economically 
crippling political backlash against trade prompted by workers who see 
themselves—with some justification—as losers from globalization.21
The arguments by Summers focus on trade and inequality in the 
U.S. and other rich countries. A similar rethinking is underway on pol-
icy for developing countries, especially in light of the sharp increases 
in inequality that have been seen there in the past two decades. On 
trade liberalization, more nuanced views on its impact on growth22 
and on distribution23 have begun to be heard more loudly. An alto-
gether more nuanced view on development policy, based on the les-
sons of the 1990s, is presented in a 2005 report by the World Bank. In 
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fact, Dani Rodrik best articulates the current state of the discourse on 
economic development more generally when he renders the following 
verdict on the globalization debate:
There was a time when global elites could comfort themselves with the 
thought that opposition to the world trading regime consisted of violent 
anarchists, self-serving protectionists, trade unionists, and ignorant, if 
idealistic youth. Meanwhile, they regarded themselves as the true pro-
gressives, because they understood that safeguarding and advancing 
globalization was the best remedy against poverty and insecurity… . But 
that self-assured attitude has all but disappeared, replaced by doubts, 
questions, and skepticism. Gone also are the violent street protests and 
mass movements against globalization. What makes news nowadays is 
the growing list of mainstream economists who are questioning global-
ization’s supposedly unmitigated virtues… . While these worries hardly 
amount to the full frontal attack mounted by the likes of Joseph Stiglitz, 
the Nobel-prize winning economist, they still constitute a remarkable 
turnaround in the intellectual climate. Moreover, even those who have 
not lost heart often disagree vehemently about the direction in which 
they would like to see globalization go.24
On the distributional front, direct interventions to mitigate the 
worst outcomes of poverty and rising inequality, through Conditional 
Cash Transfers, have exploded in Latin America, starting with Mexi-
co’s Progresa-Oportunidades program. Now most countries have such 
programs, including, for example, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia.25 The broad 
concern with distributional outcomes is reflected in the adoption of 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals by the world 
development community in 2000. These include reduction of income 
poverty, but also other goals, such as reducing infant mortality and 
improving education for the poorest.26 The broad objective of human 
development had been advocated by the UNDP’s Human Develop-
ment Reports since the 1990s. They have since become more prominent 
and, in terms of exposure, are now on par with the World Bank’s World 
Development Reports.
Perhaps the best example of the rethinking that is underway in eco-
nomic intellectual and policy circles is evidenced by the report of the 
Commission on Growth and Development (2008). This is a Commis-
sion headed by Nobel Prize-winning economist Michael Spence. The 
other academic on it is another Nobel Prize-winning economist, Robert 
Solow, the father of the modern theory of economic growth. All of the 
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other nineteen names on the Commission are non-academics, most 
of them current or former policymakers. The full membership of the 
Commission is given in Box 2. I have taken the unusual step of naming 
all the Commissioners because who they are is central to my argument. 
As a collectivity, this is surely as close as one gets to what I have called 
the “Ministry of Finance tendency”27 or what Williamson meant by 
the “Washington” of the Washington Consensus (suitably extended to 
include elite decision makers in developing countries).
Box 2
Membership of the Growth Commission
Montek Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman of the Panning Commission of 
India; Edmar Bacha, former President of the National Development Bank 
of Brazil; Boediono, Governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia; Lord 
John Browne, former CEO of British Petroleum; Kemal Dervis, former 
Finance Minister of Turkey and current Administrator of the United 
Nations Development Program; Alejandro Foxley, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Chile; Goh Chok Ton; Chairman of the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore; Hand Duck-soo, former Prime Minister of South Korea; 
Danuta Hubner, Commissioner for Regional Policy, European Commis-
sion, Poland; Carin Jamtin, former Minister for International Develop-
ment, Sweden; Pedro-Pablo Kuczyniski, Former Prime Minister of Peru; 
Danny Leipziger, Vice President of the World Bank; Trevor Manuel, 
Finance Minister of South Africa; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Finance 
Minister of Nigeria and now Managing Director of the World Bank; 
Mahmoud Mohieldin, Minister of Investment of Egypt; Robert Rubin, 
former Treasury Secretary of the USA; Robert Solow, Nobel Laureate 
in Economics; Michael Spence, Nobel Laureate in Economics; Dwight 
Venner, Governor of the Easter Caribbean Central Bank; Ernesto Zedillo, 
former President of Mexico; and Zhou Xiaouchuan, Governor of the 
Central Bank of China.
What is the Commission consensus in light of the debates and dis-
cussion I have reviewed in this section and the last? I give a flavor of 
the Commission’s report by quoting at length from the Overview in 
Box 3—perforce selectively, but I hope representatively. Perhaps mind-
ful of the potential criticism that their stance might be viewed as too 
general, the Commission does get specific. It presents a list of what it 
calls “bad ideas” for development policy, in which “the overwhelming 
weight of evidence suggests that such policies involve large costs.” It 
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does hasten to add, however, that these are suggestions, which should 
be reviewed in specific contexts. These “bad ideas” are reproduced in 
Box 4.
Box 3
Growth Commission Overview
“Growth is not an end in itself. But it makes it possible to achieve other 
important objectives of individuals and societies. It can spare people en 
masse from poverty and drudgery. Nothing else ever has. It also creates 
the resources to support health care, education, and the other Millen-
nium Development Goals to which the world has committed itself. In 
short, we take the view that growth is a necessary, if not sufficient, con-
dition for broader development, enlarging the scope for individuals to 
be productive and creative.” (p 1)
“The report …does not provide a formula for policy makers to 
apply—no generic formula exists. Each country has specific charac-
teristics and historical experiences that must be reflected in its growth 
strategy. But the report does offer a framework that should help policy 
makers create a growth strategy of their own.” (p 2)
“Growth of 7 percent a year, sustained over 25 years, was unheard of 
before the latter half of the 20th century. It is possible only because the 
world economy is now more open and integrated… .  [G]rowth strate-
gies that rely exclusively on domestic demand eventually reach their 
limits. The home market is usually too small to sustain growth for long, 
and it does not give an economy the same freedom to specialize in what-
ever it is best at producing. (p 2)
“Reforms may be admirable and represent major achievements, but 
if growth does not accelerate, or if large numbers of people do not feel 
any improvement in their circumstances, then there is more work to do. 
Relying on markets to allocate resources efficiently is clearly necessary 
(there is no known, effective substitute), but that is not the same thing as 
letting some combination of markets and a menu of reforms determine 
outcomes.” (pp 3–4)
“Wedded to the goal of high growth, governments should be prag-
matic in their pursuit of it. Orthodoxies apply only so far… .  At this 
stage, our models or predictive devices are, in important respects, 
incomplete… .  It is, therefore, prudent for governments to pursue an 
experimental approach to the implementation of economic policy… .  
Governments should sometimes proceed step by step, avoiding sudden 
shifts in policy where the potential risks outweigh the benefits. (p 3)
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“In recent decades governments were advised to “stabilize, privatize 
and liberalize.” There is merit in what lies behind this injunction—gov-
ernments should not try to do too much, replacing markets or closing the 
economy off from the rest of the world. But we believe this prescription 
defines the role of government too narrowly. Just because governments 
are sometimes clumsy and sometimes errant, does not mean they should 
be written out of the script. On the contrary, as the economy grows 
and develops, active, pragmatic governments have crucial roles to play. 
(p 4).”
“The Commission strongly believes that growth strategies cannot suc-
ceed without a commitment to equality of opportunity, giving everyone 
a fair chance to enjoy the fruits of growth. But equal opportunities are no 
guarantee of equal outcomes. Indeed, in the early stages of growth, there 
is a natural tendency for income gaps to widen. Governments should 
seek to contain this inequality, the Commission believes, at the bottom 
and top ends of the income spectrum. Otherwise, the economy’s prog-
ress may be jeopardized by divisive politics, protest, and even violent 
conflict. Again, if the ethical case does not persuade, the pragmatic one 
should.” (p 7)            Commission on Growth and Development (2008)
Box 4
“Bad Ideas” for Development Policy and Intervention
•   Subsidizing energy except for very limited subsidies targeted at 
highly vulnerable sections of the population.
•   Dealing with joblessness by relying on the civil service as an 
“employer of last resort.” This is distinct from public-works pro-
grams, such as rural employment schemes, which can provide a 
valuable social safety net.
•   Reducing fiscal deficits, because of short term macroeconomic 
compulsions, by cutting expenditure on infrastructure investment 
(or other public spending that yields large social returns in the 
long run).
•   Providing open-ended protection of specific sectors, industries, 
firms, and jobs from competition. Where support is necessary, it 
should be for a limited period, with a clear strategy for moving to 
a self-supporting structure.
•   Imposing price controls to stem inflation, which is much better 
handled through other macroeconomic policies.
•   Banning exports for long periods of time to keep domestic prices 
low for consumers at the expense of producers.
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•   Resisting urbanization and as a consequence underinvesting in 
urban infrastructure.
•   Ignoring environmental issues in the early stages of growth on the 
grounds that they are an “unaffordable luxury.”
•   Measuring educational progress solely by the construction of 
school infrastructure or even by higher enrollments, instead of 
focusing on the extent of learning and quality of education.
•   Underpaying civil servants (including teachers) relative to what 
the market would provide for comparable skills and combining 
this with promotion by seniority instead of evolving credible 
methods of measuring performance of civil servants and reward-
ing it.
•   Poor regulation of the banking system combined with excessive 
direct control and interference. In general, this prevents the devel-
opment of an efficient system of financial intermediation that has 
higher costs in terms of productivity.
•   Allowing the exchange rate to appreciate excessively before the 
economy is ready for the transition towards higher-productivity 
industry.” (pp 68–69)
Commission on Growth and Development (2008)
I believe that the Growth Commission report is a remarkable docu-
ment, not only because it is the consensus of a group of people who rep-
resent (if any group could do so) the policymaking elite on economic 
development. It is also remarkable because it reflects the debates and 
discussions of the past two decades and earlier, and an evolution in 
stance as a result of those debates. It is clearly more market and trade 
oriented than the consensus of the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s. In some ways, 
it is fully consistent with the shift away from the consensus that came 
about in the 1980s. The Growth Commission is clear that market orien-
tation should play a central role and that sustained growth cannot be 
attained without an outward orientation. Yet in many other ways it is a 
departure from the consensus of the 1980s, from the Washington Con-
sensus if you will.28 Here are no certainties of a “one size fits all” stance 
or of the negotiating mindset. There is openness to country specifici-
ties. Distributional concerns are center stage. A broader perspective on 
development—including education, health, environment—is adopted. 
All this is music to my ears, since it is what I have been arguing for 
during these last years.29 Dani Rodrik sums it up best:
The Spence report represents a watershed for development policy—as 
much for what it says as for what it leaves out. Gone are confident 
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assertions about the virtues of liberalization, deregulation, privatization, 
and free markets. Also gone are the cookie cutter policy recommenda-
tions unaffected by contextual differences. Instead, the Spence report 
adopts an approach that recognizes the limits of what we know, empha-
sizes pragmatism and gradualism, and encourages governments to be 
experimental… .  The Spence report reflects a broader intellectual shift 
within the development profession, a shift that encompasses not just 
growth strategies but also health, education, and other social policies. 
…It is to Spence’s credit that the report manages to avoid both market 
fundamentalism and institutional fundamentalism. Rather than offering 
facile answers such as “just let markets work” or “just get governance 
right,” it rightly emphasizes that each country must devise its own mix 
of remedies. Foreign economists and aid agencies can supply some of 
the ingredients, but only the country itself can provide the recipe… .  If 
there is a new Washington consensus, it is that the rulebook must be 
written at home, not in Washington.30
I would like to end this section with a brief discussion of the impli-
cations for the new consensus of the global financial crisis that began 
in late 2008. Starting with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, a crisis gripped the world’s financial system and spread to the 
real economy with alarming speed. In November, the G20 group of 
countries had a meeting of heads of state, which is seen as the start of 
a potential redesign of the global financial architecture.31 However, the 
seeds of this crisis were sown in the 1990s and the early 2000s, in the 
wave of financial sector deregulations that were enacted in the wake 
of the triumphalism of “the end of history.” I have already noted how 
the global financial crisis of the late 1990s led to a reconsideration of 
the capital account liberalization. But internal deregulation proceeded 
apace during this time as well, leading to an explosion in derivatives 
trading, lightly supervised and regulated. In the United States, these 
changes happened under a Democratic administration, and are often 
labeled “Rubinomics,” after Robert Rubin. They encompass “balanced 
budgets, free trade and financial deregulation.”32
I have discussed how rising inequality has caused a reconsideration 
of unfettered free trade among some proponents of the Washington 
Consensus of the 1990s, and how these repositionings have fed into an 
emerging new consensus reflected in the Growth Commission report. 
The current global crisis has led to a questioning of the other two 
tenets: balanced budgets and internal financial deregulation. The mas-
sive stimulus packages being recommended by the fiscal conservatives 
of yesteryear are a testament to the power not so much of ideas but of 
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“facts on the ground” to change minds and hearts. The fierce financial 
deregulators of the 1990s have now turned into equally ardent sup-
porters of (re)regulation.33
The current crisis can only strengthen the stand taken by the Growth 
Commission in some areas against the Washington Consensus. A cen-
tral issue remains, however. If it is now recognized that each country 
must be allowed the space to regulate its financial sector, to address 
emerging inequalities, and to have fiscal expansion in the face of out-
put slumps (all of which are consistent with the Growth Commission’s 
views on country specificities), then we must also face up to what this 
means for the free flow of finance capital between countries. Such free 
flow undermines policy independence and can lead to a “race to the 
bottom” as countries try to keep volatile portfolio capital. Two rem-
edies suggest themselevs: greater international coordination of policies 
or a greater degree of capital control. Even if the latter were only a 
small part of the package, it will have been quite an eventful journey, 
back to a point where capital controls are part of the legitimate dis-
course of international policy!
V. Conclusion
I have tried to place the Washington Consensus in the context of the 
evolution of the economic development discourse. This evolution has 
been argued to be dialectical in nature. The consensus of the 1980s 
was a reaction to the well-established consensus of the previous three 
decades. However, challenges to the Washington Consensus emerged 
no sooner than it had been formulated, in the realm of ideas (which 
drew on elements of the earlier consensus) and from outcomes on the 
ground. As a result, the strong positions taken up by the economic 
development policymaking elite had to be and were modified. The 
process has been ongoing, but the new consensus is perhaps best cap-
tured by the recent report of the Commission on Growth and Devel-
opment. The global financial crisis of late 2008 and into 2009 can only 
strengthen the move toward this new consensus. The new consensus 
keeps key elements of the shift away from the post-Second-World-War 
consensus, but restores other elements and adds new ingredients of its 
own. As a result, it is eclectic and not as sharp and focused as the ortho-
doxy of the 1980s. To some, this is a recipe for confusion, an “anything 
goes” scenario with a lack of clarity on specific policy advice.34 To me, 
however, it is the basis for a deeper discussion of where exactly along 
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the policy spectrum, along each dimension, a country should aim in 
order to achieve the long-run objective of economic development. •
Notes
1. Williamson 1990.
2. For example, Williamson 1999, 2002, 2004.
3. Just one example, picked almost at random, will illustrate what I have in mind. In 
an entry on April 14, 2008, Tony Karon’s “Rootless Cosmopolitan” blog provides com-
mentary on rising food prices and concludes as follows: “The interesting thing, though, 
is that solving this particular crisis will require that the World Bank and IMF abandon 
the economic orthodoxy that they imposed globally during the 1990s—the “Washington 
consensus,” that frowns on things like government spending on feeding the poor.” One 
sees this usage of the Washington Consensus all the time.
4. Kanbur 1999.
5. Some of this section is based on Kanbur 2004.
6. The influence of Fabian Socialism on Indian Prime Minister Nehru is well docu-
mented. His technical advisers were similarly oriented. To take one example, V.K.R.V. 
Rao had been a student of Keynes at Cambridge.
7. Chenery 1974.
8. Williamson 1990.
9. Kanbur 2001.
10. Ibid.
11. Bhagwati 2004, pp. 199–200.
12. Ibid., p. x.
13. See, for example, the paper by two former senior IMF officials, Prasad and Rajan 
(2008), which reflects current thinking in the IMF.
14. See, for example, Easterly 2001.
15. These issues are discussed in Kanbur 2007.
16. The institutional story of the time is well documented in Blustein 2001, 2005.
17. “This group would obviously include analysts and advocates in the full range of 
advocacy and operational NGO’s. There would also be people who worked in some of 
the UN specialized agencies, in aid ministries in the North and social sector ministries 
in the South. Amongst academics, non-economists would tend to fall into this group.” 
(Kanbur 2001).
18. I had a small part in the controversies of the time, when I resigned as the Director of 
the World Bank’s World Development Report on Poverty in May of 2000 and returned 
to Cornell University. I wrote about the analytical dimensions of the disputes in Kanbur 
2001.
19. Summers 2008.
20. Kapur, Mehta, and Subramanian 2008.
21. David Wessel, Wall Street Journal (2007).
22. Rodrik 2007.
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23. Harrison 2007.
24. Dani Rodrik 2008b.
25. I discuss these and other emerging aspects in the poverty and distribution discourse 
in Kanbur 2008.
26. For the Millennium Development Goals report, see United Nations 2007.
27. Kanbur 2001.
28. What the Washington Consensus became rather than what it started off as with Wil-
liamson (1990)—notice the similarities between some aspects of Box 1 and Boxes 3 and 
4.
29. Kanbur 1999, 2001, for example. I should also say that I wrote a background paper for 
the Commission on the importance of distributional concerns (Kanbur 2007).
30. Dani Rodrik 2008a.
31. See The White House 2008.
32. Calmes 2008.
33. See Leonhardt 2008.
34. Indeed, the evolving new set of recommended policies and interventions has some-
times been referred to as the “Washington Confusion.” (Naim 1999, Rodrik 2006)
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